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A Changing Federal-State 
Balance in Unemployment 
Insurance?
Unemployment insurance (UI) 
provides temporary partial wage 
replacement to involuntarily jobless 
workers who are strongly attached to the 
labor force. The federal-state UI system 
was established by the Social Security 
Act of 1935 during the Great Depression. 
Despite the severity of the long-term 
unemployment problem at the time, 
the UI program started modestly. The 
original aims were to alleviate hardship 
during temporary periods of joblessness, 
maintain aggregate purchasing power 
during economic downturns, preserve 
employer-employee relationships, and 
prevent descent into poverty. States’ 
reluctance to establish programs was 
overcome by the incentive of a federal 
tax with a 90 percent credit to states 
operating conforming UI programs. 
Through its benefi t and fi nancing 
mechanisms, UI is an automatic stabilizer 
for the economy. In recessions spending 
is injected through benefi ts, and benefi t 
disbursements decline in recoveries. 
Through the forward funding principle, 
states accumulate reserves during 
economic expansions and draw them 
down during recessions. The UI program 
has served well its core aims over the 
years, but the federal-state balance of 
responsibilities is changing, and current 
trends in funding and benefi t duration 
threaten the countercyclical strength of 
state programs.
Yang, Lasky, and Page (2010) of the 
Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO) 
rated UI as the best of 11 possible 
countercyclical policy measures because 
of its timeliness, strength, and temporary 
nature. Besides replacing lost earnings 
to households, they estimate UI job 
creation strength to be between two and 
fi ve times that of infrastructure spending. 
During the recent Great Recession, UI 
was particularly important in alleviating 
hardship and serving as a countercyclical 
mechanism. Acs and Dahl (2010, p. 8) 
of the CBO estimated that “in 2009, the 
poverty rate was 14.3 percent. Without 
UI benefi ts, it would have been 15.4 
percent.” 
In 2009 states paid $79 billion in 
regular UI benefi ts, while the federal 
government provided $49.2 billion in 
emergency and extended benefi ts. The 
federal support included the full $6.1 
billion cost of benefi ts paid through the 
permanent federal-state extended benefi ts 
program that is normally fi nanced 50-50 
together with the states. Despite federal 
largess, the Great Recession exhausted 
the majority of state accounts in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund. Many states 
had not accumulated adequate reserves 
before the downturn and were forced to 
borrow from the Federal Unemployment 
Account. Figure 1 shows the federal 
shares of total UI benefi t payments in 
years around recessions dating back to 
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1958. The federal shares in the past three 
years were enormous, reaching 55.7 
percent in 2011. 
The UI system was designed to be 
self-fi nancing and started with a strong 
fi nancial foundation having relatively 
high tax rates and modest benefi ts. The 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 
in 1939 set the total tax rate at 3 percent 
on the fi rst $3,000 earned by each 
employee—the same as Social Security 
at the time. A 90 percent FUTA credit 
meant a tax rate of 2.7 percent paid into 
state reserve accounts for benefi ts, with 
0.3 percent paid into federal accounts for 
program administration, loan reserves, 
and employment services. In 1939, most 
states paid weekly benefi ts equal to half 
the weekly wage up to a maximum of 
$15 for up to 16 weeks. Some offered 
as many as 26 weeks (Table 1). It was 
common at that time for states to require 
waiting periods between 2 and 4 weeks 
as a type of insurance copayment covered 
by the worker. 
After World War II, reserves 
accumulated and benefi ts improved. 
Suffi cient forward funding of benefi ts 
permitted development of state fi nancing 
systems that recovered charges three 
to fi ve years after payment when the 
economy was again in the expansion 
phase. By the late 1950s nearly all 
states provided up to 26 weeks of 
compensation. In 1959, one waiting week 
was standard in all but fi ve states. In 
the 1960s, system reserves continued to 
rise and 26 weeks became the minimum 
potential compensable duration in all 
states. 
As social insurance, UI does not 
replace all lost wages. Instead, wage 
replacement aims to cover most 
nondeferrable expenses for a median 
household. Various strands of research 
all fi nd the optimal replacement rate at 
about 50 percent of lost wages. That 
rate is said to balance socially adequate 
income replacement against possible 
work disincentives. Research also 
suggests that the common practice of 
a fi xed weekly benefi t amount for up 
to 26 weeks during joblessness would 
tend to overcompensate short spells 
and undercompensate long spells 
of unemployment (O’Leary 1998). 
Recessions starting after the fi rst OPEC 
oil embargo in 1973 put a severe strain on 
state UI fi nancing systems. Actions and 
inactions by the state and federal partners 
in response to successive crises over the 
years have tipped the balance toward a 
larger federal role in the system.
To earn their FUTA credit, states are 
required to experience rate taxes paid 
by employers based on their UI benefi t 
charges, and to have taxable wage bases 
at least as high as the FUTA level. The 
FUTA tax base has been increased 
only three times: to $4,200 in 1972, 
to $6,000 in 1978, and to the current 
level of $7,000 in 1983 by President 
Reagan. That current level is only 6.2 
percent of the $113,700 taxable wage 
base for Social Security. Since many 
states set their maximum taxable wage 
base at or near the FUTA level, the 
average tax on total payrolls has declined 
dramatically, and states often strain to 
cover ineffective charges to employers 
perpetually stuck at the maximum tax 
rate. Such employers have benefi t charges 
exceeding contributions every year, and 
are subsidized by employers whose taxes 
vary within the limits of the tax rate 
range. Thirty-fi ve states currently have UI 
taxable wage bases at or below $15,000. 
The recessions of 1975, 1980, and 
1982 resulted in signifi cant levels of 
borrowing by states to pay UI benefi ts, 
and the share of unemployed receiving 
UI continued a downward trend through 
the early 1980s. Federal actions to 
raise triggers for the extended benefi ts, 
and state actions to tighten eligibility 
requirements and enforce active job 
search all curtailed recipiency. After 
the industrial restructuring and massive 
permanent worker displacements in the 
Table 1  Benefi t and Tax Parameters of State Unemployment Insurance Systems 
over Time
Max weeks Waiting weeks Taxable wages ($) Average tax rates (%)
Year Low High Low High Low High Total Taxable
1939 13 26 2 4 3,000 3,000 2.66 2.72
1959 18 34 0 1 3,000 4,200 1.06 1.71
1979 26 39 0 1 6,000 11,200 1.26 2.67
1999 26 30 0 1 7,000 27,500 0.56 1.77
2012 20 30 0 1 7,000 38,800 0.90 3.40
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SOURCE: http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/hb394.asp (accessed January 14, 2013).
SOURCE: http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp (accessed January 14, 2013).
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1980s, both voluntary and involuntary 
part-time work expanded. Pressure to 
provide UI access for these workers 
restrained increases in UI earnings 
requirements, and this policy posture was 
activated through incentives provided 
for UI modernization in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
However, the scale of state UI borrowing 
in the Great Recession forced states to 
undertake dramatic UI program reforms. 
In 2011, interest payments were made 
on loans by 29 state UI programs. By 
2012, there remained 19 state programs 
with loans outstanding for at least two 
consecutive years. Those states were 
subject to FUTA credit reductions ranging 
from 0.3 to 1.5 percentage points. Rather 
than enacting reforms to enhance UI 
fi scal integrity, many states have accepted 
the FUTA credit reductions that rise by 
0.3 percentage points per year until the 
outstanding loans are paid off. A problem 
with this strategy occurs after the loan is 
paid off—the offset falls to zero and the 
conditions causing the shortfall remain 
unchanged. 
Five states adopted UI reforms in 
2010; of these, four states raised their 
taxable wage bases, and two enacted 
benefi t reductions. In 2011, six states 
enacted UI program changes emphasizing 
reduced benefi t entitlement; all six cut 
their maximum potential durations of 
benefi ts to 23 or fewer weeks (Vroman 
2011). These actions were probably 
infl uenced by the federal benefi ts 
extension for 2011 that prohibited 
reductions in weekly benefi ts but did not 
address durations. It has been more than 
60 years since potential durations have 
been less than 26 weeks in any state. In 
2012, Georgia implemented a system 
with maximum potential duration up to 
20 weeks if unemployment is 9.0 percent 
or higher, with the maximum falling by 
1 week for each 0.5 percentage point 
drop in the state total unemployment 
rate reaching a minimum of 14 weeks if 
unemployment is 6.5 percent or lower.
Preliminary data from a proposed 
federal Employment and Training 
Administration report on the actual 
quarterly distributions of UI benefi t 
receipt are used to shed light on the 
effects of shorter potential durations. 
In a representative state, with variable 
entitled duration, an average of 43.0 
percent of benefi ciaries exhausted the 
26-week maximum entitlements between 
2006 and 2011. Each of the benefi t 
durations between 25 and 10 weeks 
were experienced by 3–4 percent of the 
benefi ciaries, and a total of 1 percent 
had durations less than 10 weeks. Using 
an econometric benefi t fi nancing model, 
we simulated the effect on total UI 
payments under the assumption that state 
unemployment gradually declines from 
9.5 percent in 2012 to 5.8 percent in 
2021. Adopting the declining maximum 
duration feature alone, annual UI benefi t 
payments will be 39 percent lower in 
2021. We also simulated the effect of this 
change together with two others: 1) fi xing 
the maximum weekly benefi t amount at 
70 percent of its current dollar level; and 
2) changing the benefi t formula from 
being based on the high quarter only to 
the two most recent quarters—which 
includes the Ashenfelter income dip for 
displaced workers. This second bundle 
of changes is simulated to produce UI 
benefi t payments 67 percent lower in 
2021 than would result under the current 
system (Figure 2). Such packages of 
benefi t changes dramatically reduce 
the alleviation of hardship caused by 
unemployment, and seriously weaken the 
countercyclical strength of UI benefi ts.
The UI system served an important 
stabilizing function for the economy 
during the recent deep and protracted 
recession. However, federal action and 
state responses to accumulated debt 
threaten the countercyclical strength 
of the federal-state system. Reforms 
proposed by the White House and the 
Senate to raise the FUTA wage limit to 
$15,000 would broaden the tax base in 
the majority of states and should improve 
forward funding of the system. A House 
proposal to federally pay about $31 
billion in state debts would reinforce 
current trends of declining state fi scal 
preparedness. Rather than focusing 
mainly on reduced benefi t provisions to 
address fi scal diffi culties, states should 
adopt balanced packages of revenue and 
benefi t reforms. In addition to raising the 
FUTA tax base, the federal partner should 
institute minimum standards on weekly 
benefi t levels and durations, and also tie 
potential durations of any future federal 
emergency benefi ts to the existing state 
maximum durations. For example, a state 
providing up to 26 weeks would get 13 
Figure 2  Projected Benefi t Payments under Existing and Alternative Declining 
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weeks of federal temporary benefi ts, but 
if the state maximum were 20 weeks the 
federal supplement would be 10 weeks. 
A much neglected potential reform 
on the benefi t side would be to institute 
waiting periods of 2–4 weeks, with the 
duration of the wait depending inversely 
on the aggregate level of unemployment. 
Current UI take-up rates among the 
eligible unemployed range from 60 to 
80 percent depending on job market 
conditions. A somewhat longer waiting 
period will reduce program entry by 
those with ready reemployment options, 
and help to preserve the income security 
strength of the system for those who are 
involuntarily jobless for 4, 5, or 6 months. 
This approach could help preserve benefi t 
adequacy while fi scal reforms broaden the 
tax base and range of rates to restore the 
experience rating principle. Better cost 
recovery of benefi t charges will assure 
that fi nal prices of goods and services 
more properly refl ect the full cost of 
unemployment risk in their production.
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Economic and Psychological 
Consequences of Long-
Term Unemployment 
On April 1–2, 2011, the UCLA 
Institute for Research on Labor and 
Employment (IRLE) hosted an Upjohn 
Institute–sponsored conference on long-
term unemployment, its causes and 
consequences, and policies to mitigate it. 
With a loss of 7.9 million jobs from the 
start of the Great Recession in December 
2007 until jobs started to consistently 
increase in October 2010 (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2013a), the recession 
of 2007–2009 resulted in far greater job 
losses in the United States than any other 
recession in recent history. Thus, the 
conference, with participants from the 
United States, Canada, and Europe, was 
held in response to the jobs crisis that 
began with and followed from the Great 
Recession in the United States and the 
severe economic downturn felt around 
the world.
The UCLA-IRLE conference was 
held 21 months after the recovery from 
the Great Recession had begun, and 
the United States was still mired in a 
severe jobs crisis, having created only 
1.1 million jobs during the 21 months 
from July 2009 through March 2011. 
While this job growth was welcomed, 
it did little to alleviate unemployment, 
as it would have taken the creation of 
more than 2 million jobs in this time 
period merely to keep up with the 
growth in the working age population. In 
addition, in March 2011, the month prior 
to the conference, 8.4 million workers 
were working part time when they 
wanted to have full-time positions. The 
unemployment rate was 8.8 percent, and 
45.5 percent of the unemployed found 
themselves out of work for 6 months or 
more. One-third of the unemployed had 
been looking for work for at least one 
year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013a,b). 
The book Reconnecting to Work: 
Policies to Mitigate Long-Term 
Unemployment and Its Consequences, 
published recently by the Upjohn 
Institute, is based on the proceedings 
of the 2011 conference. Although the 
employment situation in the United 
States has since improved somewhat, 
with unemployment dropping to below 
8 percent in September 2012 for the fi rst 
time since January 2009, this book is 
still all too relevant (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2013b). The jobs defi cit is 
worse and jobs recovery slower following 
the Great Recession than in the fi ve 
preceding recessions (see Figure 1).
While the unemployment rate has in 
fact declined, the country still faces a 
jobs defi cit of 4 million compared with 
the number of jobs in the economy in 
December 2007 (plus more than 5 million 
jobs that should have been created 
since the start of the recession to keep 
up with the growth in the working age 
population). The rate of job growth has 
been increasing, but not fast enough—at 
the current rate, it will take until the next 
decade to alleviate the jobs defi cit created 
by the recession (Baker 2013). Moreover, 
despite the recent improvement in 
the unemployment rate, the broader 
measure of unemployment that includes 
individuals working part time for 
economic reasons and those who are 
only marginally attached to the labor 
force has remained much higher—14.4 
percent in December 2012. Also in 
that month, there were 7.9 million 
people who were working part-time for 
economic reasons. While there were 
500,000 fewer involuntary part-time 
workers in December 2012 than when 
the conference was held in April 2011, 
there were still 3.3 million more of 
these workers that month than when 
the recession began in December 2007. 
Furthermore, long-term unemployment 
remains a serious problem in the United 
